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THE CONSTITUTION AT 200: REFLECTIONS ON
THE PAST -

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Derrick Bell*

There is a lively refrain in a popular gospel hymn that says
of the Lord:
He may not be there when I call him, but he's right
on time.
That marvelous affirmation of faith came to mind when I read
that the committee planning this conference had invited Justice
Thurgood Marshall to participate. The committee reported that
there was no response to its invitation. Those of us who go back
to the founding of this organization can testify to similar silences in response to efforts over the years to persuade the nation's most famous civil rights lawyer and first black Supreme
Court justice to grace our meetings with his presence.
I intend neither to offend Justice Marshall nor surprise you
in stating the facts: even before his health limited his speaking
appearances, Marshall expressed little interest in appearing
before NCBL gatherings. Now that is the truth ... Justice Marshall has not been there when NCBL wanted him. And yet it is
also true that most of us would give him the highest marks for
his opinions in defense of individual rights.
Also, and this is the point of all of this, Marshall was "right
on time" with his outspoken Bicentennial speech of last spring.
Indeed, nothing that we NCBL members do or say here is likely
to win the public attention or bring on us the criticism
Thurgood Marshall engendered when he suggested that the
praise likely to be heaped on the Framers during the Bicentennial celebrations should be more restrained than it is likely to
be. Since then, the talk - deemed front page news by the New
York Times'- has been discussed at every Bicentennial gather* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
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ing, and re-published in periodicals, including Harper's2 and believe it or not - Ebony' magazine.
Liberals in general and black folks in particular welcomed
Marshall's remarks. Many though thought it was "bad taste" to
bring up the subject of slavery during the Bicentennial celebrations, thereby calling for rain on a sunny occasion. One conservative legal group urged Marshall to resign because his remarks "reflect a deep-seated bitterness and dislike that impair
his capacity."" Critics accused him of twisting history, asserting
that to charge the Framers with endorsing slavery is unfair.
Those racial paranoids among us may be excused if we suspect that the vehemence of the criticism is due less to what was
said than to who was saying it. Beep your horns if you discern in
the attacks the message I hear, namely that: Marshall should be
grateful for his seat on the high court and as a black should express that gratitude by a respectful silence during patriotic
occasions.
Marshall violated this unstated maxim by reminding his audience that the Constitution denied the basic right to vote to
blacks and women, a majority of the population. He committed
a serious social faux pas when he declared the Constitution "defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
and momentous social transformations to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today."'
Again, to borrow the gospel singer's lines, Marshall may not be
there when NCBL wants him, but he's right on time.
Justice Marshall's comments, seen in historic perspective,
play out the role of Constitutional critic. It is a familiar function
for black people, one that is as necessary today as when the Constitution was drafted. NCBL must not neglect its duty to perform that function.
You know, the crises provoked by the Meeses and Borks
2. Marshall, Celebrating The Constitution: A Dissent, HARPER'S, July 1987, at 17.
3. Marshall, The Real Meaning of the Constitution Bicentennial, EBONY, Sept. 1987,
at 62.
4. Gest, Blasts Bicentennial of Constitution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 18,
1987, at 12.
5. Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association in Maui, Hawaii, May 6, 1987.
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have always been with us ...

and we will meet them as we have

met those in the past. But we must seize the time to be reflective
about what has happened in the past so that we may more effectively do what needs to be done in the future.
Few seem to realize that courageous candor as exemplified
by Thurgood Marshall's speech exposes deficiencies of our basic
law and provokes reform in structure and interpretation that
make the Constitution worth celebrating. We have every right to
be proud of the Constitution today for, as we shall see, black
people -

often at great risk and in perilous times -

did more

than any other group to transform a property protecting document into one that begins to protect individual rights. And, it is
in this tradition that Geneva Crenshaw, the black, civil rights
lawyer heroine of And We Are Not Saved,' is transported back
to the Constitutional Convention in an effort to convince the
Framers that they should not incorporate slavery into the new
government. She fails, of course, but she discovers reasons for
the Framers' actions that have a most troubling contemporary
ring.
As you might expect, Geneva's arrival was not greeted
calmly. But let me quote a portion of her Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction:
My trip back through time left me disoriented, but
when I regained my bearings, there I was ...

standing at

the podium at the Constitutional Convention. The year, I
knew, was 1787.
The meeting room was hot. The doors, closed and
locked to insure secrecy, rendered the heat oppressive.
The few dozen delegates looked tired. They had doubtless been meeting all day and now they were caucusing in
small groups. So intense were their discussions that the
few men who looked my way could not readily take in the
appearance, on what had just been an empty platform, of
a woman . . . who was black.

I expected the extraordinary powers that had transported me here to protect me from harm. Still, my hands
were wet with nervous perspiration, and my throat was
dry. Taking a deep breath, I picked up the gavel and
6. D.

BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE

(1987).
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quickly struck the desktop twice, hard. "Gentlemen, my
name is Geneva Crenshaw, and I have come here from
the late twentieth century to question your inclusion of
slavery in the document you are writing."
For perhaps ten seconds, there was a shocked silence. Then the chamber exploded with delegates' shouts
and oaths. A warm welcome would have been too much
to expect, but their expressions of outrage at my sudden
presence turned into an angry commotion unrelieved by
even a modicum of curiosity.
When I remained standing at the podium, unmoved
by their strong language and dire threats, several of the
more robust delegates charged toward the platform, determined to carry out the others shouted orders: "Eject
the Negro woman at once!"
Suddenly, the hall was filled with the sound of martial music, blasting trumpets, and a deafening roll of
snare drums. At the same time - and as the delegates
were almost upon me - a cylinder composed of thin vertical bars of red, white, and blue light descended swiftly
and silently from the high ceiling, nicely encapsulating
the podium and me. The self-appointed eviction party
neither slowed nor swerved. As each man reached and
tried to pass through the transparent light shield, there
was a loud SssZap, quite like the sound electrified bug
zappers make on a warm, summer evening. While not lethal, the shock the shield dealt each attacker was sufficiently strong to literally knock him to the floor, stunned
and shaking.
The injured delegates all seemed to recover quickly,
except one who had tried to pierce the light shield with
his sword. The weapon instantly glowed red hot and
burned his hand. At that point, several delegates tried to
rush out of the room either to escape or to seek help but neither doors nor windows would open.
"Gentlemen," I repeated, but no one heard me in the
turmoil of shouted orders, cries of outrage, and efforts to
sound the alarm to those outside. Scanning the room, I
saw, a swarthy delegate cock his long pistol, aim carefully, and fire directly at me. But the ball hit the shield,
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ricocheted back into the room, and shattered an inkwell,
splattering my intended assassin with red ink. The swift
but painless retaliation visited on the man who fired
stunned the delegates into silence.
"Gentlemen," I began again, "Delegates" - then
paused and, with a slight smile, added, "fellow citizens. I
have come to urge that, in your great work here, you not
restrict to white men of property the sweep of Thomas
Jefferson's self-evident truths. For all men (and women
too) are equal and endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights, including 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.'"
The debate that ensues between Geneva and the Framers is
vigorous, but despite the extraordinary powers at her disposal,
Geneva is unable to alter the already reached compromises on
slavery. During their heated exchanges, Geneva saw quickly the
inaccuracy of the traditional rationalizations that the slavery
provisions in the Constitution were merely unfortunate concessions pressured by the crisis of events and influenced by then
prevailing beliefs that: (1) slavery was on the decline and would
soon die of its own weight; or that (2) Africans were thought a
different and inferior breed of beings and their enslavement carried no moral onus.
The insistence of Southern delegates on protection of their
slave property was far too vigorous to suggest that the institution would soon be abandoned.' And the anti-slavery statements
by slaves and white abolitionists alike were too forceful to suggest that the slavery compromises were the product of men who
did not know the moral ramifications of what they did.'
7. Even on the unpopular subject of importing slaves, Southern delegates were adamant. John Rutledge from South Carolina warned: "If the Convention thinks that N.C.;
S.C. & Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such fools as to

give up so important an interest." II

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF

1787 373 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
8. The debate over the morality of slavery had raged for years with influential Americans denouncing slavery as a corrupt and morally unjustifiable practice. See, e.g., W.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: 1760-1848, 42-43
(1977). And slaves themselves petitioned governmental officials and legislatures to abolish slavery. See, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
5-12 (H. Aptheker ed. 1968).
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Geneva tries to embarrass the Framers by pointing out the
contradiction in their commitment to freedom and liberty and
their embrace of slavery. They would not buy it:
"There is no contradiction in our compromise," replied one delegate. "Life and liberty are generally said to
be of more value, than property, . . . [but] an accurate
view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property is the main object of Society."
"A contradiction," another added, "would occur were
we to follow the course you urge. We are not unaware of
the moral issues raised by slavery, but we have no response to the Southern delegates who admonish us that
'property in slaves should not be exposed to danger
under a Government instituted for the protection of
property.'"
"Government," he continued, "was instituted principally for the protection of property and was itself ...
supported by property. Property is the great object of
government; the great cause of war; the great means of
carrying it on. The primary protection the Southerners
seek is that their government not take their slaves from
them. After all, Negroes are their wealth, their only
resource."
Where, Geneva wondered, were those delegates from Northern states, many of whom abhorred slavery and had spoken out
against it in the Convention. She found her answer in the castigation she received from one of the Framers who told her:
"Woman, we would have you gone from this place.
But if a record be made, that record should show that the
economic benefits of slavery do not accrue only to the
South. Plantation states provide a market for Northern
factories, and the New England shipping industry and
merchants participate in the slave trade. Northern states,
moreover, utilize slaves in the fields, as domestics, and
even as soldiers to defend against Indian raids."
"Slavery has provided the wealth that made independence possible," another delegate told her. "The profits from slavery funded the Revolution. It cannot be denied. At the time of the Revolution, the goods for which
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the United States demanded freedom were produced in
very large measure by slave labor. Desperately needing
assistance from other countries, we purchased this aid
from France with tobacco produced mainly by slave labor. The nation's economic well-being depended on the
institution, and its preservation is essential if the Constitution we are drafting is to be more than a useless document. At least, that is how we view the crisis we face."
Realizing that she was losing the debate, Geneva intensified
her efforts, but the imprisoned delegates' signals for help had
been seen and the local militia was summoned. Hearing some
commotion beyond the window, she turned to see a small cannon being rolled up, and aimed at her. Then, in quick succession, a militiaman lighted the fuse; the delegates dived under
their desks; the cannon fired; and, with an ear-splitting roar, the
cannonball broke against the light shield and splintered, leaving
the shield intact, but terminating both the visit and all memory
of it.
But what of our original question. Did the Framers have a
choice? At the most dramatic moment of the debate, a somber
delegate got to his feet, and walked slowly right up to the light
shield before he spoke directly to Geneva:
"Woman. You are right. The contradiction of which
you speak is real. Surely we know, even though we are at
pains not to mention it, that we have sacrificed the rights
of some in the belief that this involuntary forfeiture is
necessary to secure the interests of others in a society espousing, as its basic principle, the liberty of all."
"And," he added, "you have, by now, heard enough
to realize that we have not lightly reached the compromises on slavery you so deplore. It is simply that the
delegates gathered here with the responsibility of forming
a radically new government in perilous times, see more
clearly than is possible for you in hindsight that the unavoidable cost of our labors will be the need to accept and
live with what you call a contradiction. If you know our
future as well as you claim, then you must be aware of
many more instances in which we sacrificed your rights in
order to protect and further our own."
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We who are the descendants of those first victims of the
Constitutional compromises on slavery, have the post-slavery
record as evidence that they are far more than an embarrassing
blot on our national history. Rather, they are the original and
still definitive examples of the on-going struggle between individual rights reform and the maintenance of the socio-economic
status quo.
As was the case in Philadelphia, some of the most dramatic
of these encounters involve blacks and racial issues, and as happened in 1787, the resolutions effected are more readily made
because of the shared sense of superiority that the differing
white groups use as a basis for compromises that sacrifice the
interests of blacks.
The Framers felt that the country could not have come into
being without the race-based, slavery compromises placed in the
Constitution. First, they were all too aware of the economic benefits of slavery; and second, they were likely aware as well that
the very presence of blacks posed a threat that served to unify
whites across class lines.
It is worth spending a few moments to examine how these
factors that played a very major role in the nation's birth also
influenced its growth and development.
By 1857, the nation's economic development had stretched
the initial slavery compromises to the breaking point. Differences between planters and business interests that had been
papered over 70 years earlier by greater mutual dangers, could
no longer be settled by the involuntary sacrifice of black rights.
Chief Justice Taney's conclusion in Dred Scott9 that blacks
had no rights whites were bound to respect - a view rather
clearly reflecting the prevailing belief in his time as among the
Founding Fathers - was a shock less because it sought formally
to remove all blacks outside the ambit of Constitutional protection, than because it placed the Supreme Court on one side of
the fiercely contested issues of economic and political power that
were propelling the nation toward the Civil War.
But after the Civil War Amendments were enacted and then
cast aside, constitutional jurisprudence fell in line with Taney's
conclusion regarding the rights of blacks vis a vis whites even as
9.

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1856).
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his opinion was condemned. And in the post-Reconstruction era,
the constitutional protections initially promoted to shield former
slaves were transformed into the major, legal bulwarks for corporate growth. The legal philosophy of that era espoused liberty
of action untrammelled by state authority, but the only logic of
the ideology - and its goal - was the exploitation of the working class for the benefit of big business. 10
Consider Lochner v. New York," where the Court refused
to find that the state's police powers extended to protecting bakers against employers who required them to work in physically
unhealthy conditions for more than 10 hours per day and 60
hours per week. Such extension, the Court held, would interfere
12
with the baker's freedom of contract.
Then, compare Lochner with the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson," decided only ten years earlier. In Plessy, the Court upheld the state's police power to segregate blacks in public facilities even though such segregation must, of necessity, interfere
with the liberties of facilities' owners to use their property as
they saw fit. 4
Here, a century later, we have another Constitutional Contradiction. Both opinions are quite similar in the Court's use of
fourteenth amendment fictions: the assumed economic "liberty"
of bakers in Lochner, and the assumed political "equality" of
blacks in Plessy. Those assumptions, of course, required the
most blatant form of hypocrisy. Both decisions protected the existing property and political arrangements and ignored the disadvantages to the powerless caught in those relationships: the
exploited whites (in Lochner) and segregated blacks (in Plessy).
In both decisions, the first Justice Harlan railed in dissent
against the majority's refusal to recognize what they all knew:
the injustice of declaring the law's formal equality in a grossly
unequal world:
In Lochner, Harlan was morally right, but out-of-step with
the prevailing "liberty of contract" doctrine in suggesting that
the state's authority under its police power to protect its citi10. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12.

Id. at 58.

13.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

14.

Id. at 543-44.
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zens' health and safety was sufficient to justify a statute that he
conceded may have had "its origin, in part, in the belief that
employers and employees in such establishments were not upon
an equal footing, and that the necessities of the latter often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their
strength. ' 15 He did not - as Justice Holmes did in his dissent
- directly attack the Court's adoption of the laissez-faire economic philosophy that underlay the Lochner era cases.
In Plessy, though, Harlan urged - this time in line with
Lochnerian philosophy - that the state's segregation laws violated fourteenth amendment prohibitions by interfering with the
personal liberty of citizens. He predicted accurately enough that
segregation laws would signal the subordination by race of all
blacks, and would "permit the seeds of race hate to be planted
under the sanction of law. '"1

But as in Lochner, Harlan, while addressing the human injustices with great and articulate vigor, was unable to come to
grips with the majority's view that "liberty" was a property-related right, and that the state's segregation laws, far from interfering with liberty, were furthering that property in whiteness
that entitled those holding it to the right not to associate in
public places with blacks.
Harlan's now famous platitude: "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,"'"
was even more a fiction than those upon which the Court majority relied. Moreover, it was a wholly inadequate response to a
Court majority claiming its readiness to defend blacks' entitlement to "legal equality" under the law. In challenging the segregation law though, the majority viewed blacks as seeking a Constitutional guarantee of "social as distinguished from political
equality ....."Is And the Court was quite certain that the four-

teenth amendment had not granted blacks the social status of
whites, a status the Court conceded for the purposes of this case
was a property right. 19 In effect, the Court refused to take from
15. 198 U.S. at 69.
16. 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 559.
18. Id. at 544.
19. Id. at 549. The plaintiff had argued that in any racially mixed community, "the
reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is property,
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whites the vested advantages of their whiteness, an important
one of which -

in those days -

was the right not to associate

with blacks in public facilities.
Justice Harlan, by the way, failed to tell us how a colorblind Constitution could be expected to provide even the most
basic protection to blacks in a country where by his own prideful
admission

-

set out in the same paragraph

-

he declared:

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. 0
For the fact is that the general belief as to why the white
race is dominant in the society has helped motivate - and justify - the many compromises in which the interests of blacks
are bartered and sometimes sacrificed to further accords between groups of whites. Over time, beliefs in white dominance,
rein forced by policies that subordinate black interests to those
of whites have led -

as the plaintiff in Plessy contended -

to

an unrecognized but no less viable property right in whiteness
that serves as entitlement to those advantages gained over
blacks by virtue of a white identity. This "right of whiteness,"
while nowhere mentioned in the property casebooks, is valued
and protected like all other property in a system constructed
and maintained primarily for that purpose.
Actually, Berea College v. Kentucky" was perhaps an even
more striking illustration than Plessy of the Court's readiness to
view state segregation laws as protective of rather than a threat
to private property interests under the Lochner rationale. Decided only three years after Lochner, the Court in Berea College
upheld a state statute that barred the private school from conIn conceding
..
this to be so, the majority was at a loss to see how the segregation
statute deprived plaintiff - a black - of any right to such property. A white assigned to
a colored coach would have an action for damages against the company for being deprived of this property, but if, the Court said a colored man was assigned to a car for the
colored race, "he has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to
the reputation of being a white man." Id.
20. Id. at 559.
21. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

.
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tinuing its policy of integrated education. The Court reasoned
that, since the state which chartered the college could revoke the
charter, it could also amend it to prohibit instruction of the two
races at the same time and in the same place without defeating
or impairing the object of the original charter.2
Focus on the corporate charter did not serve to obscure the
fact that the Court's hands-off attitude on segregation legislation that overrode principles of free association, occupational
liberty, freedom of contract, and property rights, posed a seeming contradiction in the era of freewheeling, laissez-faire constitutionalism.2 3 But in that era of rampant Negrophobia supported by social Darwinism, few beyond the Justice Harlans
and, of course, the blacks themselves, were much concerned with
judicial findings that state-sponsored restraints could further individual freedoms.
This year, we observed the thirty-third anniversary of the
Court's rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson,24 but the commemoration - like that for the
Emancipation Proclamation - is more to console us for "what
we might have gained" than to celebrate "the steadily diminishing rights we have." For in the late twentieth century, the passwords for gaining judicial recognition of the still viable property
right of "whiteness" include "higher entrance scores,' 2 5 "seniority," 26 and "neighborhood schools. 21 7
Black people, thus have been the major victims in Constitutional history, but they are also its principal heroes. For they
have both survived the continued subordination of their rights,
and in their effort to gain - through law - the entitlement, as
the Supreme Court put it in Strauder v. West Virginia,2" to "all
the civil rights that the superior race enjoy, ' 29 they have provided neglected understandings of value for those involved in
22. Id. at 53, 57-8.
23. A. BICKEL, B. SCHMIDT,

THE JUDICIARY

AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

1910-21,

VOL. 10 OF THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

736 (1984).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Id. at 306.

UNITED STATES

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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the increasingly inscrutable endeavor we call Constitutional
interpretation.
Professor Arthur Kinoy makes this point when he writes:
"One of the most fascinating areas of the evolution of our constitutional law yet to be explored is the catalyzing effect of the
myriad forms of struggle for Negro freedom and equality upon
liberties applicable
the development of constitutional rights 3and
0
alike."
black
and
white
to all citizens
It is something of a paradox, but while the Constitution, by
its terms, specifically excluded blacks from its historic recognition and protection of individual rights, the major implementation of individual rights for all Americans has come through the
efforts by blacks and their supporters to use the law to eliminate
first slavery and then racial discrimination.
For verification of these scholarly observations, one need
only explore some of the major civil rights precedents: for example, the right to fairly apportioned electoral districts,3 protection of freedom of speech as against powerful, public figures,3 2
elimination of invalidated criteria from civil service tests and
other job qualifications,33 the admission of college students on
criteria other than social class related grades and test scores,34
elimination of poll taxes, 5 protection of whites charged with
crime from trial by a jury selected on a racially discriminatory
basis. 3 6 The value of these decisions to all Americans are more
than happy coincidences, a societally beneficial fallout of the
long freedom struggle in the courts by blacks.
For the injustices that so dramatically diminish the rights of
blacks because of race also point up serious disadvantages suffered by many whites, particularly those who lack money and
power. Clearly, there is a little recognized but intricate relation30. Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 389
n.6 (1967).
31. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that a state statute adjusting
city boundaries effectively deprived black citizens of their right to vote in violation of the
fifteenth amendment).
32. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing the "actual malice"
standard in libel law for public officials in the context of a northern newspaper's advertisement criticizing a southern public official).
33. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
35. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
36. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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ship of race and political and social reform.
Discrimination based on race provides a dramatic focus that
reveals more subtle though hardly less pernicious disadvantage
suffered by many whites. By looking carefully at black history,
and the struggle for opportunity and dignity, one can observe as
well the history of most whites. The whites' better-off status is
ascertained by comparison with the position of those blacks on
the bottom, and it is this compulsive fascination that seems to
obscure the far more sizeable gap between the status of most
whites and those who occupy the far more lofty levels at the top
of our society.
The challenge in this Bicentennial Year remains what it has
been from the beginning of the American age: extending the
meaning of liberty under the Constitution to those who lack the
property prerequisites our law has usually required for its full
enjoyment. The Constitutional formula for reform must be ascertained, not from the words - as Justice Marshall boldly told
the country - but from the workings of a document that has
gained immeasurably from those whose economic and political
interests were not represented back in Philadelphia. We will do
little cheering during this Bicentennial season. A critical assessment of the Constitution reveals that much still remains to be
done. Let us continue.

